INTRODUCTION
Microfinance offers promise for alleviating poverty by providing financial services to people traditionally excluded from financial markets. Small-scale loans can relieve capital constraints that might otherwise preclude cash-strapped entrepreneurs from investing in profitable businesses, while savings services can create opportunities to accumulate wealth in safe repositories and to manage risk through asset diversification. While this promise of microfinance is widely touted, it is infrequently subject to careful evaluation using detailed data.
This chapter examines the extension of microfinance services to people in Kenya. Using data collected from seventeen Financial Service Associations (FSAs) founded by the Kenya Rural Enterprise Program (K-REP) Development Agency (KDA), we explore the intricacies of microfinance institutions emerging in these challenging environment.
Similar to cooperatives, FSAs mobilize local resources, capitalize upon local information and wealth, and tie it back into the local economic system by investing in borrowers who are members of the FSA community. Human resources too are local, as staff and board members are recruited from the village and trained by KDA in FSA administration, accounting, and portfolio management. FSAs introduce scale-appropriate investment instruments in equity as well as in savings. By presenting accessible opportunities to hold assets in a different and hypothetically safer form, FSAs can, in principle, provide a safe repository for savings as well as start-up capital to potential entrepreneurs, who otherwise might be prevented from engaging in business due to binding liquidity constraints. If they can indeed foster asset diversification and the creation of business opportunities, FSAs have a potentially pivotal role to play in regions struggling to achieve economic growth. But given the experience we document below, achieving this promise seems to require some changes in design and practice. groups which collectively guarantee loans issued to their members. All members are barred from further access to credit in the case of default by one group member, providing strong incentives for the group to ensure repayment by each individual borrower.
Stiglitz ' (1990) seminal work on peer selection and monitoring argues that joint liability reduces informational asymmetries between borrower and lender. Without indicators signaling creditworthiness, such as established credit histories and regular wage salaries, outside lenders protect against the threat of default by charging a high rate of interest or requiring significant collateral, irrespective of credit risk heterogeneity among borrowers. The lender's inability to observe the borrower's risk type yields the standard example of adverse selection.
In contrast with external formal sector lenders, a community shares a great deal of knowledge about its members. Joint liability harnesses this familiarity to circumvent the problem of asymmetric information. Participants affiliate with others of similar risk-profiles because the group is liable for the loan repayments of all members. The threat of sharing liability on a defaulting member's loan moderates the problem of adverse selection as groups rationally exclude potential members with high levels of ex ante risk. Using community knowledge, interdependent groups reduce the lender's ex ante risk exposure in two ways: by excluding high risk types from joining into their group and by approving only those loans whose risk they are willing to share within the group. Contractual interdependence through group lending not only reduces ex-ante risk, but also moderates ex post risk. Intensive peer monitoring of the borrower after loan disbursement diminishes moral hazard, or diversion of the loan toward investments riskier than its agreed upon purpose. Borrowers repay in a timely and efficient manner to safeguard the group's continued access to future loans. By reducing the risks of asymmetric information and moral hazard, groups enable the lender to afford lower interest rates and reduce, or eradicate, collateral requirements. As the poor lack vehicles for wealth creation, the ability of group lenders to circumvent stringent collateral requirements via joint liability is a key feature rendering microfinance accessible to the poor.
Group lending reduces informational asymmetries and increases borrowers' willingness to repay through informal sanctions. Besley and Coate (1995) show that group-levied social sanctions, including peer pressure, loss of social prestige, and social isolation, can improve rates of loan repayment. Joint liability transfers certain fixed costs of small-scale lending, including screening, contract, monitoring, and enforcement, from the bank to the group, rendering financially viable the administration of small loans in rural areas to people traditionally regarded as high-risk. Though joint liability imposes some non-trivial costs upon participants, including frequent group meetings and limited access to individual credit, members of groups continue to seek loans. Empirical evidence generally supports the superiority of group lending repayment rates over repayment rates of loans issued to individuals (Adams and von Pischke, 1992; Yaron, 1994; Conning, 1999; and Woolcock, 1999) .
Savings, too, emerges as a critical component of MFI success by serving as collateral on loans and "introduc(ing) and enhanc(ing) financial discipline among inexperienced, first-time, small-scale borrowers" (Yaron, 1994, p.52) . Microcredit is explicitly costly, with effective annual interest rates of up to 130%, while savings is relatively cheap, leading Yaron and others to speculate that savings facilities can serve a greater number of clients than lending services.
They further claim success in mobilizing savings as the optimal, and in some cases unique, path toward MFI financial self-sustainablity. Well-established empirical evidence supports this perspective (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Hollis and Sweetman, 1998; Christen, 1998; and Morduch, 2000) .
OVERVIEW OF KDA
Founded in 1984 by World Education, Inc., the Kenya Rural Enterprise Program (K-REP) was designed to provide credit and technical assistance to financial services NGOs (Pederson and Kiiru, 1997) . Pederson To address the severely limited financial services available in areas traditionally ignored by commercial banks, Jazayeri (1996) modeled the FSA as a self-reliant, small-scale financial institution catering to a community's niche needs by harnessing local equity capital, thereby releasing the institution from dependence upon the goodwill of external funding agencies. A survey of ten prominent MFIs in Africa and Asia by Zeller et al. (1997) concludes that limiting the role of donors to funding start-up costs increases the chances of MFI financial viability.
initial provision of operational materials; training in bookkeeping, marketing, and management for the FSA officials, staff, and members; and a yearly audit service to check the books, calculate share value, and provide technical assistance. KDA grants these goods and services to the FSA, and in addition hires and trains a Field Coordinator (FC), a professional with an accounting background, native to the region. FCs are assigned several FSAs in the region and assist in raising share capital, while helping the fledgling FSA with addressing technical issues.
In the FSA model, the institution is owned and managed by the community, and targets the poorest twenty percent of the population (Pederson and Kiiru, 1997 FSA bylaws allow members to apply for loans up to four times the value of their shareholdings, thus rewarding investment in the bank, while at the same time limiting idiosyncratic risk exposure. Loan applications require personal information as well as loan use details, making explicit the consequences of loan default, which includes the imposition of stiff penalties, the seizure and subsequent sale of collateral, as well as pressure applied to loan guarantors. In addition, members are encouraged to deposit savings in the FSA, up to ten times the value of their shareholdings. In contrast to the sale of shares, monies deposited as savings cannot be invested, thus the FSA faces a one hundred percent reserve requirement on deposits.
Because of this restriction on the employment of deposits, savings earn no interest payments.
Protection of equity investment encourages FSA members to monitor borrowers and ensure prompt repayment. Share values increase as FSAs earns profits from interest payments and penalties collected, and fall when loans default. All shareholders share an equity incentive to stay informed about the status of FSA loans. Facilitating the exchange of information between FSA staff, the Board of Directors, and shareholders, Annual General Meetings (AGMs) make explicit the current share value and publicize borrowers in poor standing, generating the threat of social sanctions imposed on defaulters by the shareholding community. The ideal of stringent application screening combined with intensive peer monitoring encouraged Jazayeri to predict the average FSA to attain total administrative and financial sustainability in two years.
DATA AND METHODS
The objective of this section is to explain the methods used in data collection and analysis to address the following questions: In the Eastern Province, the members herding animals far from town were excluded from the sampling frame. Only town dwellers and members located not further than 10 kilometers from town were included in the sampling frame. Truly nomadic pastoralist members were excluded, due to lack of transportation and roads and lack of accurate information about the whereabouts of pastoralists in search of forage and water. This selection may cause a problem of bias in the data as the sample of northern members surveyed is not entirely random. However, few members were excluded due to inaccessibility, with the exception of Kalacha FSA, where one third of the originally sampled were summarily excluded due to inaccessibility. In total, 17 staff, 108 Board, 282 member and 292 non-member surveys were collected from 14 sites.
FSA PERFORMANCE
We begin with a cross sectional analysis of data derived from monthly monitoring reports LGen variable will be negative. Overall, 67% (34 of 51) of FSAs reported share values higher than the purchase price of 300KSh, and 25% (13 of 51) reported share value loss. Note that without disbursing loans (LGen equals zero), share value can be no higher or lower than 300KSh.
Members, the number of FSA shareholders, and Members 2 , the number of members squared, capture the prospective nonlinear relationship between membership and FSA profits.
Though expansion of the FSA by member recruitment increases the loan fund, it may simultaneously tax the FSA community's ability to self-regulate through screening and peer Loans and Loans 2 represent the number of loans disbursed and that quantity squared, respectively. The logic of this quadratic specification is quite similar to that for membership. A high count of loans disbursed, controlling for Loan Generation, likely signals great demand for credit due to profitable local business opportunities. This should be associated with increased share values, as reflected in positive estimated regression coefficients on at least the first of these variables.
As mentioned previously, a strong emphasis upon savings typifies many successful microfinance programs. In KDA's model however, FSAs are prohibited from productively employing savings except as deposits in commercial banks, a linkage which none of the sampled
FSAs had yet established. From the FSA's perspective, savings represents a liability as they must be administered and safeguarded at the opportunity cost of additional share capital which could theoretically earn a positive rate of return though efficient loan repayment. Though regulations render savings deposits a deadweight liability, savings can nonetheless serve as loan insurance or collateral, to be confiscated in the event of loan default, or less drastically, to draw upon for loan repayment. In addition, some FSAs have implemented savings withdrawal fees, to pay for the fixed costs of transactions. Savers tallies the number of members who have ever saved at the FSA, Savers 2 is the number of savers squared. If the role of savings in the FSA is indeed a key determinant success as predicted in the literature, and profits increase in savers at an increasing rate, then the regression should yield positive coefficient estimates for these savings variables. is sufficient to purchase sundries (e.g., soap, spices, tea) for petty trade and to cover the fixed transactions costs of traveling to town to buy those supplies. In four of the five Northern FSAs, however, loans of 1,200KSh are insufficient to cover even the round-trip transport costs to Marsabit town, the nearest source for traders' provisions, leaving nothing for the acquisition of inventory. The negative estimated coefficient on the North variable may thus reflect regional differences in minimum efficient scale of lending given regional variation in the costs of commerce.
The greater the number of times the loan fund is turned over, the lower the return on investment, as indicated by the LGen's significant, negative coefficient. LGen, it becomes difficult to attract new members, as FSA membership appears a moneylosing proposition. Reaching optimal scale thus likely depends on improvement in lending design and performance to stem share value degradation. The individual household survey data we collected offers an uncommon opportunity to address these key questions. We estimated a probit model to test these hypotheses, with robust standard errors clustered on region to preserve asymptotic validity in the presence of potential heteroskedasticity (Table 4) 
FSA MEMBERSHIP

PURCHASE OF MULTIPLE FSA SHARES
To what extent do those who belong to the FSA utilize FSA services more or less intensively? We consider participation first in terms of shareholdings, both because greater share purchases signal heavier equity investment in the FSA and because of the critical relationship between shareholdings and loan size. Having chosen to join the FSA, what motivates some members to purchase additional shares? The number of shares one owns determines one's borrowing and saving limits with the FSA, so we would expect share ownership conditional on membership to be driven largely by demand for credit and savings products.
Before delving into the regression model, we note that of the 282 FSA members interviewed, 180 purchased only one share, the minimum required for FSA inclusion. Of the 102 members who purchased multiple shares, over half purchased either two or three shares.
Amongst multiple shareholders, 46 percent do not save at the FSA, as opposed to 56 percent of single share shareholders. If therefore seems implausible that members are buying multiple shares so as to access higher savings ceilings. Table 5 presents a breakdown of loans accessed by members by shareholding categories.
Of the 180 members who own a single share, only 12% borrowed from the FSA. In contrast, of the 70 members who own between two and five shares, 36% borrowed from the FSA, as did 64% of the 48 members holding more than five shares. Members with large shareholdings not only borrow more frequently than do single share holders, they also borrow larger amounts.
Seven members (two percent of the sample) holding more than 10 shares each received eleven loans worth 26% of the total value of loans disbursed, more than the 240 (80.5%) members who owned three or fewer shares combined. Clearly, multiple share purchases are strongly associated with highly concentrated lending patterns. The following Poisson count data model estimated to establish the relationship between the number of FSA shares owned by the respondent and member characteristics. NumberShares = f(YQuint1-4, WQuint1-4, Savings000, Livestock, North, NorthLive,
where NumberShares is the total number of shares owned by a member respondent. We use the same income and asset distribution indicator variables described for the membership probit. We control for regional poverty by including the Headcount independent variable, as defined previously. Members from poorer locations with limited financial service availability might find FSA investment particularly attractive, leading to greater share purchases at the intensive margin.
Finally, we include the inverse Mills ratio, InverseMills, as calculated from the membership probit estimated in the previous section. If the coefficient estimate on the inverse Mill's ratio is significantly different than zero, this corrects for the selection bias associated with choosing to become a member of the FSA (Heckman, 1979) . Table 6 presents the results of the Poisson regression. If multiple share ownership were driven by demand for diversification into savings, the correlation coefficient with nonfinancial wealth should be positive. The fact that multiple FSA share ownership is instead negative and statistically significantly associated with household nonfinancial wealth underscores that multiple share ownership appears driven by members' demand for credit, as opposed to savings. This is also reflected in the strongly positive and statistically significant relation between household income and multiple share ownership. It takes money to buy shares and, as we shall see, to borrow money. 
USE OF FSA SAVINGS INSTRUMENTS
As explained previously, the FSA generates its own capital entirely from sales of shares because the reserve requirement on savings is 100%. What explains member's decisions to avail themselves of the savings instruments offered by FSAs? 34 percent of the 299 members interviewed had used FSA savings, though this ratio drops to less than 5 percent of the 88 northern FSA members. Members holding savings balances were asked about their motivations for savings with the FSA. Conversely, members who do not save at the FSA were asked why they choose not to.
The most frequently cited reason for saving with the FSA was easy access to deposits in times of need. In addition, savers appreciated FSA proximity, security, and the opportunity to accumulate capital to achieve long-term investment goals. A few of the Kwale and Migori FSAs were in the process of requiring savings to access loans, as reflected in nearly eight percent of savers citing the desire to access loans as the motivation for saving at the FSA.
Lack of funds dominated the reasons offered for not saving at the FSA. Lack of accessibility and lack of security ranked a distant second and third. All the respondents who did not save at the FSA for lack of trust in the institution were from the North, including the wife of the Chairman of the Board of one FSA! Similarly all who attribute not saving at the FSA to lack of information about savings services are from the North, as are eighty percent of those concerned with the zero interest paid to deposits. Despite the scarcity of savers at Northern FSAs, there might exist a latent demand for savings not serviced by FSAs due to poor community image, lack of trust, a stagnant rate of return, and poor information dissemination.
BORROWING FROM THE FSA
Of the sampled FSA membership, only 15 percent borrow from the FSA. Those 85 percent investing in the FSA without borrowing bear, in the value of their share holdings, the default risk of the minority of members who do take out loans. We already observed that the likelihood of borrowing generally increases in the number of shares owned, which is itself positively related to income and negatively associated with nonfinancial wealth, including nondiversified holding of livestock assets. We now explore in greater detail the question of which members borrow from the FSA.
We investigate this question using the following probit regression model with the dependent variable FSALoan which equals one if the member borrowed from the FSA, zero otherwise.
FSALoan = f(YQuint1-4, WQuint1-4, NumberShares, CreditSources, Savings000).
Most of the independent variables have been previously defined, in particular the income and wealth quintile variables. In order to further define the relationship between shareholdings and borrowing, the variable NumberShares is included as a regressor. Controlling for the number of shares a member owns, we want to establish whether borrowing is related to income or wealth. Similarly, is our earlier hypothesis that borrowing demand motivates the purchase of multiple shares substantiated by a positive association between borrowing and the number of shares a member owns, controlling for income and wealth? Estimation results are presented in Table 7 . The coefficient estimates associated with the income quintiles suggest that it is not the poorest 20 percent of the population that receives loans.
Rather, members in uppermost income quintile are the most likely to receive FSA loans, contrary to KDA's stated objective. Likelihood of borrowing is weakly, negatively related to nonfinancial wealth. The number of FSA shares owned has a strongly positive and statistically significant effect on borrowing, even controlling for member income and wealth, which we earlier established are key determinants of multiple share ownership. This reinforces our conclusion that multiple share ownership is motivated primarily by members' desire to access loan capital.
The negative coefficient estimate associated with the non-FSA savings variable indicates that those with adequate savings are less likely to borrow from the FSA. Savings provide a substitute vehicle for members to self-insure against income shocks and to accumulate investment capital. Since the opportunity cost of savings, current consumption, is often lower than the cost of interest-bearing loans, members with liquid savings are commonly better served saving rather than borrowing.
FSA LOAN REPAYMENT
We have established that higher income individuals are more likely to become members of the FSA. Conditional upon having chosen to join the FSA, those members with the highest incomes are more likely to borrow from the FSA and to purchase multiple shares, allowing them to access higher value loans. We have also seen that FSA share value have been declining, on average, across KDA's FSAs, with the decline strongly related to the number of generations of loans the FSA has made. This strongly indicates that loan repayment is a problem for FSAs.
The borrowing pattern evident in the data, including multiple share ownership patterns, raises the possibility that FSAs are not serving the poor as delineated in KDA's stated goals. Given that poorer members are less likely to borrow but hold shares which erode at the same rate as all other members' shareholdings, and that higher income members are more likely to borrow, and in larger amounts, then FSAs might be inadvertently facilitating de facto transfers from poorer to wealthier members if these better-off borrowers are not reliably repaying loans. Exploring loan repayment patterns becomes essential if we are to understand the distributional effects of FSAs in Kenya.
Analyzing loan repayment behavior is tricky, however. Seventy five of the 298 members in the sample took loans ranging in size from 500 to 35,000KSh, with a mean of 6,223KSh and a median of 3,600KSh. But when we asked about loan repayment behavior, all but eight respondents claimed to have repaid their loans on time, and those eight reported suffering no negative consequences as a result of their delinquency. Evidence presented by FSA records disputes the veracity of these payment claims, as we demonstrate below. Reconstructing loan repayments from respondent recall is unconstructive, thus we turn from the survey data to an alternate data source for loan repayment analysis: FSA records.
The quality of FSA records fluctuated from site to site, ranging from well-kept general ledgers to scraps of cash-in and cash-out vouchers. FSAs varied tremendously in their thoroughness of bookkeeping due to Manager's education level, training received from KDA, frequency of FC contact, staff turnover rate, as well as the detail of information demanded by the local Board of Directors. It was not uncommon for the staff and board members to have no idea about FSA share value, nor how to compute it. Share value was often calculated exclusively by KDA auditors who arrived once each year to evaluate books, confirm deposits, and assess share value.
We gathered data on 894 loans, or 91.6% of the 983 total loans issued by nine FSAs.
Loans from the remaining five sampled FSAs were not included in analysis due to lack of data either owing to time constraints (Rongo, Magunga, and Msambweni), because loans had not yet been issued (Kikoneni), or because loans issued were not yet due (Kalacha). Although 983 loans were issued by these nine FSAs, we were unable to extract information from 89 of them due to missing records. This near-census of loans was taken out by a broader range of members than those randomly sampled. Unfortunately, these data lack some of the information the survey included, most notably member income, asset, and characteristic information. We are not aware
of other published studies that analyze microfinance data at this level of detail.
The 894 
Loan Repayment
Of the 894 FSA loans issued in sample, 59% (579) were paid in entirety, 13% (113) received no principal repayments, and principal was partially repaid for the remaining 28%
(202). Thus, 35% (315) of the 894 loans were in arrears, defined as loans with principal past due. The amount in arrears represents 24% of the total value of loans issued, and 64% of total share capital. On average, 61% of principal due had been paid on the 315 loans in arrears.
Of the loans in arrears, 13 percent are emergency loans, which represent 17% of all loans.
Although we hypothesized that due to the additional rigor of the regular loan approval process might cause emergency to default at a higher rate than regular loans, this does not appear true, implying that the credit committee does not effectively screen out high risk loans. Indeed, scant discrimination among loan applications is evident. For example, the Credit Committee turned down only 2.4% (3/340) of loan applications to the North Horr FSA. This calls into question the assumption that the local Board of Directors harness superior local knowledge so as to protect FSA assets against loans with high levels of ex-ante credit risk. Mude (forthcoming) posits that the intricate nature of social relations binding community members makes it personally beneficial for volunteer Board of Directors members to issue loans, despite a priori shared knowledge that applicants are bad credit risks. Rejecting loan applications ex ante or enforcing penalties ex post results in disutility borne personally by FSA officials in the form of rancor, illwill, strained social relations, etc. On the other hand, the disutility of delinquent loans is distributed across all shareholders. If the personal costs to officials of loan applicant rejection outweigh the personal costs these officials bear as shareholders due to issuing risky loans, then it becomes individually rational for FSA officials to issue loans expected to under-perform, and not to pursue on-performing loans. Of course, this "loans makes friends" hypothesis turns the canonical logic of Stiglitz (1990) -that "friends make loans" -on its head.
It is informative to look at loan repayments rates by loan size. Recall that the upper bound on loan size is a direct function of shares held by the borrower, which we earlier established is strongly and positively associated with income. If the relatively poor face more difficulties in repaying their loans, we would therefore expect repayment rates to vary inversely with loan size. However, descriptive statistics reveal that loans of 1,200KSh and below have no higher a rate of default (39%) than any other loan group. In fact, the largest loans, of 15,000KSh
and more, suffer the highest default rate (53%). Although shareholding is positively associated with income, it does not appear to signal increased propensity to repay.
To explore repayment rates in more detail, we estimate the following doubly-censored Tobit model, censored at both zero and one hundred percent, relating loan repayment percentage to loan size, type of loan, and location as captured through site specific dummy variables. %Repaid = f(Principal000, Emergency, Headcount, AvgAltern, SiteSepcificDummies)
%Repaid is a continuous variable from zero to one capturing the percentage of principal repaid on a loan. Principal000 reflects loan size (in thousands KSh). If larger loans are indeed more prone to default, then we would expect a negative coefficient estimate on Principal000.
Emergency is a dummy variable, equaling 1 if the loan issued was an emergency loan, 0 for a regular loan. Though theory predicts that less carefully screened emergency loan applications should default at a higher rate, the descriptive statistics suggest no such unconditional effect.
Moreover, since emergency loans are smaller and the unconditional descriptive statistics suggest that larger loans default at a higher rate, the loan size effect could be masking the loan screening effect on repayment performance. The estimated relationship between principal repaid and repayment percentage is negative and statistically significant, confirming that repayment is decreasing in loan size (Table   8 ). Those with the largest loans default most. We already established that the probability of borrowing and the number of shares held (and thus a member's borrowing limit) are positively and significantly related to household income. Thus it appears that the highest income FSA members are most likely to default and the lowest income members are least likely to borrow or default. The implication is that poorly performing FSAs are providing a de facto mechanism for regressive transfers from lower income non-borrowing members to higher income, borrowingand-defaulting members. The coefficient estimate on the Headcount variable is positive and significant, affirming that loans made in poorer areas exhibit higher rates of repayment. Note that this effect in independent of the relationship between poverty and the availability of alternative financial services providers, which has a negative and significant association with the percentage of principal repaid.
Implications of Loan Size and Loan Delinquency
The repayment rate difference between large and small loans has acute repercussions.
The 269 loans of 1,200KSh or less represent a mere 7% of total portfolio value. In contrast, the 200 loans greater than or equal to 10,000KSh comprised 60% of the principal borrowed (Table   9 ). FSAs are heavily exposed to default risk associated with large loans, which are typically made to higher income members. Indeed, the value of the principal in arrears on the 20 loans greater than 15,000KSh that have not fully repaid (286,006Ksh) is comparable to the total principal paid out in the smallest 269 loans (304,450KSh). The 20 largest loans in default represent 14% of total share value for the 2,886 total KDA members across 9 sites. The minimum investment value of the shares required to access these large loans is greater than the total annual incomes of 66% of the survey respondents who purchased only one share. With these accounting corrections, the performance of FSAs becomes worse. After recalculation, 729 of the 894 total loans were in arrears, totaling 39% of loan principal, or 78% of share capital. In contrast, the official accounts calculated principal outstanding as 24% and 64% of loan principal and share capital, respectively. Accurate accounting more than doubles the number of loans with 90 to 100% of principal past due from 88 to 190. When we look at the distribution of the numbers of loans and arrears across loan size (Figures 1 and 2) , it becomes evident that the vast majority of loans are not repaid in their entirety. If penalties were properly assessed, few loans would show completely clear accounts. The value of the principal past due on the largest 206 loans of 10,000KSh or more now increases to 25% of the total principal issued, or 53% of the current portfolio. The increased principal in default results in average share value loss of 78%, with over half of this loss attributable to 184 defaulting members, each holding loans of 6,000KSh or more. 
CONCLUSIONS
KDA FSAs serve primarily higher income individuals, who not only are the most likely to become members, but are also most likely to borrow, to purchase multiple shares and thereby to take out larger loans, which we have demonstrated default at a higher rate than smaller loans.
Unsustainably high rates of loan delinquency seriously erode share value and threaten FSA financial viability. Thus, despite their stated mission, KDA FSAs are typically bypassing the poorest members of the communities they serve and implicitly fostering regressive wealth distribution from lower-income, non-borrowing members to higher-income members more likely to take out and default on large loans. An important lesson to learn is that without careful analysis of the patterns of benefits reaped and the bearers of costs borne, we cannot accept at face-value that an initiative is "pro-poor".
So what can be done to improve this situation? First, by linking loan limits to shareholdings, FSAs reserve large loans for those with sufficient disposable income to purchase of multiple shares. Decoupling loan size and shareholdings would allow for more progressive lending, whereby larger loans are issued based upon an established credit history of successfully paying back smaller loans. Then, the FSA could better direct loans toward the creditworthy poor, as opposed to the relatively wealthy who can afford multiple shares. This policy change could have particular impact in the northern FSAs, where the loan size available to poorer members holding only one share is insufficient to cover the costs of transportation into town, thereby effectively precluding productive investment of borrowed capital.
Improved ex ante screening and ex post monitoring of loans is plainly necessary.
Protection of equity investment does not appear to provide adequate motivation for rigorous loan application screening and loan monitoring by Boards of Directors. Though this decentralized approach taps into local knowledge, it can also be encumbered by local-level power relations and social considerations that make it rational for the Board to approve loans to uncreditworthy borrowers and not to pursue bad debt (Mude forthcoming). It might be worth exploring compensation schemes for Board members who supervise a healthy portfolio so as to offset the personal costs incurred when Boards reject loan applications and exercise personal influence and moral suasion to recover delinquent loans.
To protect share capital, not only do KCM's have to be trained in their role of screening member loan applications and pursuing defaulters within their group, but additional training of staff and board members in loan screening, accounting, and management is required to confer A shift in priorities from loan issuance to providing secure savings might be the most effective means to improve FSA financial viability and to serve the poor. This would require reducing fixed fees (e.g. passbook charges) and offering interest payments so that smaller deposit volumes can earn a reasonable rate of return. It would also require relaxing the present 100% reserve requirement on savings deposits. Without a structural change in FSA bylaws however, FSAs will continue to prefer to collect share capital to invest rather than to amass unproductive savings deposits.
